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THE STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL OUTLOOK: WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED AND WHERE ARE WE HEADED?**
ROY BAHL* AND DAVID L. SJOQUIST*
I. Introduction

II. The Changes in Fiscal Federalism

THE spective
spectivedecade
of state
of ofandstate
localthegovern1980s, and local from govern- the per-

government sector in the national economy grew throughout the 1960s and early
1970s. By the mid-1970s, direct expendi-

The importance of the state and local

ments, was radically different from the

1960s and 1970s. The 1960s were the hal-

tures of state and local governments accyon days - steady economic growth, low
for 17.9 percent of total U.S. perinflation, and a dramatic increase in counted
the
sonal income. However, this growing
flow of intergovernmental grants to state

importance relative to personal income
and local governments. State and local
stopped
in the 1980s, so that the sector
governments learned little about fiscal
accounted for about the same 16 percent
discipline during this period - their overof personal income in 1989 that it did in
spending or undertaxing mistakes were
1980. A good indicator of this change is
covered by economic growth or an in-

the expenditure retrenchment of state and
creased flow of federal grants. The 1970s
were very different, with double-digit local
in- goods. Real per capita expenditures
increased
by an average of about $39 per
flation, historically high interest rates, a

year during the 1980-1988 period comprotracted recession and slow economic
pared
growth - conditions that in combination with a real per capita personal inwith the lack of fiscal discipline ledcome
to increase of $253 per year. Thus, at
the margin in the 1980s, 15.4 cents of
fiscal crisis at the local level. The 1980s
every dollar earned net of inflation was
began with a short but deep recession folspent
lowed by the longest recovery period in to purchase state and local government goods, while the comparable marU.S. history, and a moderate inflation relginal expenditure rate for the 1970-1980
ative to the 1970s. The late 1970s and the
period was 24.4 cents.
1980s were periods of important change
in federal and state tax policy and in in- Many would attribute the general slowdown in growth of the state and local sectergovernmental fiscal relations. There
were two major federal income tax re-tor relative to the growth in personal informs, a tax limitation movement whichcome to the fiscally conservative view that

led to numerous pledges of no tax in-many voters, and therefore politicians,
took as the 1970s drew to a close. The New
creases, a plethora of state tax reforms
York City financial debacle, the tax limaimed at simplifying revenue structures

itation movement that began with Propwith greater concern for economic devel-

13, and a popular President who
opment than with vertical equity, andosition
a

cut in the real flow of federal aid.

convincingly equated the prosperity of the

whether the 1990s will be an extension of

ison to the earlier two decades. As is shown

that will break these trends.

back the shares of expenditures on the
traditional social services while they in-

American economy to low taxes all fueled
How did state and local governments
this movement.
respond to the economic conditions and
political movements of the 1980s? TheThe slowdown in the growth of state and
local government was not primarily achypothesis we raise in this paper is that
complished by legislated limits. It was
there has been a change in the fiscal bethe result of political pressures to
havior of state and local governments more
in
hold the line on expenditures by comparthe 1980s. We also speculate about

below, states and local governments cut
the 1980s, or whether there are new forces
vested cash balances to earn substantial

*Gerogia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303. returns, and many states established rainy

321

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 19:19:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

322 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XLIII
day funds. On the revenue
bilized side,
a greaterthe
share fiscal
of personal income
conservative movement in
pressured
even
the
revenues received
a significantly
greater
liberal governors to begin
their
level focusing
of per capita federal
grants. States
tax reform efforts on economic
developin all four census
regions, on average,
ment rather than redistribution
objecmoved with this general
trend.

tives. States with a tradition
steeply
During theof
1960s
and 1970s, the state
progressive nominal income tax rate
and local government sector increased in
structures - such as New York and Minimportance relative to the federal governnesota - began to pare back their top
ment. For example, in 1960, 36 percent of
marginal rates. This, in turn, reduced direct
the
government expenditures were made
long-run elasticity of the revenue system
by state and local governments, while in
and its built-in revenue growth.
1979 it was 43 percent. Beginning in 1980,
These conclusions about growth depend
however, the trend reversed, so that by
to some extent on the break-point chosen,
1989 only 39 percent of direct govern-

because there has been some increase in

ment expenditures were made by state and

spending and taxing in the period since
local governments. This was partly due to
the 1981 recession. The growth rates federal
in
level aid reductions, but the share

the state and local sectors in almost every
of own source revenue raised by state and
category of fiscal activity are greater for
local governments in the 1980s increased
the post-recession 1980s than for the 1970s
dramatically. The share of own source
(Table 1).
revenues raised at the subnational level
The key to understanding whether there rose from about 43 percent in 1980 to 48
has been a structural shift in state and
percent in 1989. Part of this increase was

local government fiscal behavior in the
due to rising state and local government
1980s is understanding the pattern oftaxes - equivalent to about 1 percent of
revenue mobilization. On the revenue side,
personal income - but it was also due to

state and local government revenues raiseda slowdown in the growth of federal taxes
from own sources increased from 12.0
due in part to the greater sensitivity of
percent of personal income in 1980 to 13.4
the federal income tax to the recession of
percent in 1986, before falling to 12.9 perthe early 1980s and to the federal tax re-

cent in 1989.

Substantial interstate variations lie be-

forms of 1981 and 1986. State governments, on the other hand, experienced a

neath these average changes in revenue revenue windfall from the 1986 base
mobilization. Another part of understand- broadening reform.
ing whether there has been a structural Finally, there is the question of whether
break is understanding the extent to which there has been a shift in emphasis as bethese trends are uniform and the kinds of tween the state and local government secstates that have gone with and against the tors in the 1980s. For the two decades prior
trend. There was no significant interstate to 1980, there was a trend toward cencorrelation between revenue mobilization
tralization of state and local government
and per capita income in 1967 or in 1987, finances to the state government level. The
but in 1977 (immediately after the reces- state government share of own source
sion) high income states were mobilizing
revenue rose from 49 to 59 percent be-

a significantly greater revenue share. Thistween 1960 and 1980, while the state's
finding for the post 1975 recession periodshare of direct expenditures increased from
is consistent with the ACIR's (1986) ob36 to 39 percent. There are a number of

servation that states experiencing fiscal explanations for this trend. One is that

stress will be the ones who increase tax

state government income and sales taxes

efforts, and with the fact that many higher
are more buoyant than local property

income states were hardest hit by that
taxes, and there was a substantial growth
recession. The 1980s, Gold and Zelio (1989)
in real income. Another is that state govnote, has been more of a case of low taxernments increased assistance to locally
ing (and lower income) states catching up.
provided services in some cases, and diIn all years, however, states which morectly assumed service responsibilities in
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others, largely to forestall
politically
untion (the share
of state and local
governmenteffective
revenue raised atrate
the state
level) in
popular increases in the
of
property taxation. Yet
theanother
1967-1977 period
possibility
increased substan-

is that the states were better able to look

tially. Between 1977 and 1988 only 17

after themselves with discretionary

states had a substantial increase in rev-

changes in sales and income tax rates than enue centralization, compared to 36 states
were local governments who had to relyin the period 1967-77, while 15 states deon the property tax - another manifesta- centralized (Table 2). A trend toward cention of John Shannon's (1986), "Fend For tralization in the period 1977-88 is more

Yourself Federalism." Whatever the rea-

evident on the expenditure side. The avson, this trend was interrupted in erage
the state government share of expen1980s and there has been a slight reducditures rose slightly (from 38 to 40 pertion in the state government shares of cent),
own but 21 states centralized their
source revenues and essentially no change
expenditure responsibility while only 12
decentralized.
in the state government share of expenditures.
These data tell a story of changing inThere is, however, considerable intertergovernmental finance in the 1980s. The

state variation in the pattern of the
responsibility for revenue raising has

shifted from the federal toward the statechanges in fiscal dominance of state gov-

local sector, while within the state-local
ernments. Average revenue centralizaTABLE 2
TRENDS IN FISCAL CENTRALIZATION IN

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Increased* Increased No
Centralization Decentralization Change
Revenues

1967-1977
36
4
1977-1988
17
15

10
18

Expenditures

1967-1977
1977-1988

increased

16
21

12
12

22
17

revenue

central

and
local
government
gen
points.
Expenditure
centr
expenditures.
Decentraliz

SOURCE:

U.S.

Bureau
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sector the trend toward state fiscal cen-

total state and local government revenues. However, from 1977 to 1988 the retralization may have stopped. Revenue
efforts by state and local governments have
liance of state and local governments on
increased since the early 1980s to make
federal grants fell from 21.6 percent to 16.2

up for federal aid reductions. There is some
percent of total revenues. In real per capita terms, the reduction has been from
evidence of a trend toward uniformity
$456 in 1980 to $381 in 1989, a level comamong the states in the relative importance of state government responsibilityparable to that in the early 1970s. Most
for expenditures and revenue raisingof the slack from reduced federal aid has
(Bahl, 1989).
been picked up by increases in selective

sales taxes (e.g., gasoline), user/benefit

charges, and from a mixture of lotteries,
interest income, royalties, and a broad assortment of licenses. Many of these "other"
revenues are not available for general use
by state and local governments. Revenues

III. The Changing Structure of
Revenues and Expenditures
A. The Structure of Revenues

from the traditional broad-based state and

There have been decided shifts in the

local government taxes declined from 12.8
percent
of personal income in 1978 to 11.5
structure of revenues and expenditures
in
in 1987.
the past decade (Table 3). The most percent
sig-

nificant change is the decline in federal
Of the mainstays in general state and

grants as a financing source. Throughout
local taxes, the most interesting trend is

most of the 1970s, federal grants inthat the long-term pattern of decreased
creased in real terms and as a percent
of on the property tax was arrested
reliance
TABLE 3

CHANGES IN REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Revenue Sources

Federal Property Income Sales As a Percent of

Year

Aid

Tax

Tax

Tax

Personal

Income

1967 16.9 28.7 6.3 22.1 9.4
1977 21.6 22.0 13.4 21.2 11.0
1981 21.3 17.7 14.3 20.3 9.5
1988 16.2 18.2 15.4 21.5 10.4

Expenditures

by

Function

Public Health & Expenditures

Education Welfare Hospitals Highways Per Capita
1967
1977
1981
1988

40.9

8.8

37.7
36.0
34.6

SOURCE:

7.1

12.6
12.9
12.3

14.9

8.3
8.9
8.8

U.S.

$1453

8.5
8.6
7.9

1865
1881
2191

Bureau

of
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theproperty
new belief that the
benefits
of the nain the 1980s, and the
tax
share
highway
rest at
the local
actually increased attional
the
end system
of the
decade. The trend of rapid
in relilevel, increase
and the deteriorating
condition of
ance on income taxation
in the
roads andstopped
bridges throughout
the country

(see sales
Hulten and
Peterson (1984)).
1980s, and the share of
taxation
rose.

It would not be too far off the mark to

If these traditional functions of state and

summarize this pattern of change by saylocal government all are experiencing reing that there has been a general shiftduced
to- shares of total budgets, then where
ward more self-sufficiency in financing,
are the increases occurring? The answer

more use of benefit or quasi-benefit
is interest expense, expenditures on the
charges (gasoline taxes) and more use of common local government functions, and

consumption versus income taxes.
B. The Structure of Expenditures

general administration, including corrections and the judicial system.
C. Federal Aid

During this same period, there was a
significant change in the distribution of In 1977, the mean level of per capita
state and local government expenditures federal grants was $437 (in 1982 dollars),
across functions. Between 1967 and 1977, and ranged from 77 percent above the
28 states increased their budget share on mean in Hawaii to 28 percent below in

education, and as a result, about 3.2 cents Florida. By 1988, the real mean had fallen
more of every dollar spent went for edu- to $403, but the range had broadened to
cation. Since 1977, no state has increased 93 percent above in Wyoming and 37 perits share of expenditures for education and cent below in Florida.1 Over this same peabout 1.4 cents less of each dollar is now

riod, interstate variations in per capita

personal income have not narrowed. In
spent on education. The pattern of change
in education spending may be interpreted
1977, the high state (Nevada) was 22 per-

as showing that the combination of cent
en- above the mean and the low state was

rollment reductions, the general pressure
25 percent below; whereas in 1988 the
to trim budgets and the political push range
to
was 46 percent above the mean for
hold down property tax increases was sufthe high state (Connecticut) and 29 perficient to offset the push to improve the
cent below for the low state (Mississippi).

general quality of education and to take
These statistics prompt one to wonder
whether the interstate distribution of fedon the costly job of attacking the problems of inner city schools.
eral grants has become more equalizing,
Some other trends of the 1970s were also
and in particular whether the per capita
reversed. The share of spending of wel-distribution favors the lower income states.
fare, and health and hospitals, was re- A very simple test to examine the rela-

duced - a pattern that will surprise many tionship between grants and income is the
in light of the pronouncement of a grow-computation of a simple correlation coefing portion of the US population below theficient between per capita federal aid and
poverty line, and the increasing cost ofper capita income. A negative and signifhealth care. The aggregate share of health, icant coefficient may be interpreted as
education and welfare expenditures in showing that lower income states receive

state and local government budgets hassignificantly more grants in per capita

declined from 58.6 percent in 1977 to 55.7terms, a positive and significant coeffipercent in 1988. The share spent on high- cient shows a counter-equalizing pattern,
ways has declined since the early 1970s i.e., richer states get more; and a nonsigand this decline has continued into the
nificant coefficient shows no relationship
1980s. Some attribute this to the complebetween income level and the receipt of
tion of the interstate highway network,
grants.

but there are other considerations that

The results of this analysis, presented
might have led one to look for increases
in Table 4, show that grants were signifin the share of spending for highways
- counter-equalizing in the 1960s,
icantly
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TABLE 4

SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME AND
FEDERAL GRANTS

Federal Grants

Per Capita as a Percent

Federal Grants of General Revenues

1967
1977
1983
1988

0.65*
-0.21
0.02
-0.68*
0.09
-0.66*
-0.08
-0.69*

*Significant

at

0.01

level.

NOTE: Excludes Alaska.

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Government Finances, Series GS-88-5, various years.

changed, i.e., whether there has been a
and were neutral with respect to inter-

change in underlying behavior. State and
state variations in per capita income since

local government per capita general exthe 1970s and 1980s. The US grant sys-

penditures in 1988 varied from highs of
tem may work to equalize some indicator
$4,279 and $4,217 in Wyoming and New
of needs, or some other measure of fiscal
York, to lows of $1,948 and $2,141 in Arcapacity, and it may even stimulate higher
kansas and Missouri (excluding Alaska).
taxing states to do more by way of revePublic policy analysts have long been innue mobilization, but it does not redis-

tribute federal tax dollars toward the lower
terested in the study of determinants of

income states. It is also interesting tothis
see variation, and much empirical and
work has been done.2 The rewho the biggest losers have been intheoretical
the
sults of the empirical studies tend to
federal grant retrenchment of the 1980s.

As shown in Table 5, the ten states square
suf- with economic theory and a sig-

nificant portion of the interstate variafering the largest real per capita federal
tion in per capita expenditures can be exgrant loss between 1980 and 1988 tended

plained.
to be those with above average fiscal
caIn this paper, no attempt is made to depacities.
velop a new theoretical model. Rather, we
want to answer two simple questions: (a)
D. Expenditure Determinants
Given the changes over the past three
decades, it is of interest to investigate

to what extent are interstate variations

in the level of per capita expenditures associated with differences in per capita in-

come, population, and land area and how
has this relationship changed over the
years, and (b) has the relationship bevariations in per capita expenditures have

whether the determinants of interstate
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TABLE 5
LOSS OF FEDERAL AID

Reduction of Federal

Aid as a Percent of Tax Capacity
State

Average Loss Index

1980-88

Delaware
Florida
Hawaii

150
77

Michigan

Missouri
Nevada

Mexico

Mean

124

86

96

141

Vermont

113

82

103

Hampshire

New

121
105

142

Massachusetts

New

1986

106

110.1

99

U.S.

Bureau

Commissi

Federalism,

tween

capita

19
91

110.8

Advisory

Fiscal

1

105

108

SOURCE:

93

147

19

per
capita
f
minants of interstate
variations in public
expenditures,
expenditures have not changed much over

the past 20 years.
come,
population
a
in
the
past
In a second set of equations
two
federal aid
de
The
results
has been added as anof
independent a
vari- reg
signed
to
answer
th
able. The relationship
with per capita exsented
in
Table
penditures is
positive and significant. 6.
capita
expenditure
States that receive larger amounts of fedis
positive
and
signi
eral grants, on
average, can be expected
the
regression
to spend and presumably tax signifi-coef
bly stable. Land area shows a positive
cantly more.3 Despite federal aid reduccoefficient reflecting the higher cost oftions, interstate variations in per capita
serving a more dispersed population and expenditures are as closely associated with
the high fixed cost of providing certain per capita federal grants in the 1980s as
services. The coefficients are significant they were in the 1970s. However, a given
in all years. Population size is negatively per capita grant difference appears to be
related to per capita expenditures, hold- associated with a much greater per capita
ing constant land area and income, sug- expenditure difference in the latter years.
gesting that larger urban agglomera-

tions, cet . par., may offer some economies
IV. Surplus
of size. There is little change in the pop-

ulation regression coefficients over this One measure of the fiscal condition of
time period. In short, the "basic" deter- state and local government is the general
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surplus reported as part
of between
the National
fluctuations
surplus and deficit
Income and Product position.
Accounts.
The genFrom the mid-1970s
until 1986,
eral surplus is measured
difference
state as
and the
local governments
ran either

between current revenues and total ex-

surpluses or very small deficits. But since
penditures, excluding contributions to1986,
so- the deficits have become increascial insurance funds but including capital
ingly large, reaching a level in 1989.IV
expenditures. Although it is by no means
that exceeds the largest (real) quarterly
a perfect measure of the fiscal health
of prior to 1989 by over fifty percent.
deficit

state and local governments, the general
It is also apparent from Figure 1 that

surplus does provide an indirect measure
although swings in the surplus do not cor-

of changes in their fiscal condition.respond
The
perfectly with changes in GNP,
flaws in this measure are by now well
the surplus is cyclical; it tends to be
known.4 Obviously, a change in the smaller
surduring downturns and larger
plus could be the result of either anduring
in- upturns. Has the cyclical sensitiv-

crease in revenue (for example, because
ityof
of the surplus increased over the three

decades?
a tax increase) or a decrease in expenditures. Furthermore, the general surplus
The cyclical swing in the general suris calculated only for the total stateplus
andbetween the five business cycles that
since 1960 is described in Table
local sector, and therefore we must occurred
rely
on other sources and other measures of
8. Two alternative measures are presurplus to separate state from local govsented. In Columns 2 and 3 we present the
ernments and/or to provide any geodifference in the average quarterly gengraphic detail.
eral surplus in a contraction and in the
There has been a nearly continuous defollowing expansion, in current and in
cline in the general surplus since 1984 constant
and
(1982) dollars. For example, the
a growing deficit since 1987 (Table 7). The
average quarterly surplus swung from a
general surplus fell from $21.1 billion
negative $5.1 billion during the 1970.1-

(1982 dollars) in 1984.11, to $-32.9 billion
1970.IV contraction to a positive $1.2 bilin 1989.IV. These amounts, deflated to real
lion during the 1971.I-1973.IV expanterms, represent the second highest quarsion, for a swing of a positive $6.3 billion
($15 billion in 1982 dollars). These numterly surplus and the largest deficit in the
past three decades.
bers show an interesting pattern. During
This decline in the general surplus sugthe long business cycle of the 1960s, the

gests a number of questions. First, average
are
position of state and local govthese levels (and swings) in the surplus
ernments was a deficit of about $1 billion
and deficit abnormal by comparison with
real (1982) dollars. However, during the
other periods? Second, what factors next
ex- three cycles, an average surplus was
plain these movements in the general
realized as the economy shifted from consurplus? Third, does the change in the
traction to expansion, but the amounts of

surplus reflect a structural change in the
the swing were increasingly smaller. This
behavior of state and local government?
decline in the real size of the swing sug-

The trend from 1958.1 through 1990.1
gests that the cyclical sensitivity of the
in the quarterly general surplus in 1982
surplus had declined.

dollars and the quarter-to-quarter changeA second way of looking at the swing is

in real GNP are compared in Figureto
1. compare the trough and peak of the

During the 1960s and through 1972.1 the
general surplus during a cycle. Columns
(annualized) surplus was negative in every
(3) and (4) of Table 8 present the maxiquarter, reflecting a large amount of debt
mum swing within a cycle. For example,

financing of the growing state and local
during the 1974 to 1979 period, the surgovernment capital stock. Beginningplus
in swung from a quarterly low of $-11.4
1972, the surplus turned positive and bebillion in 1975.1 to a high of $13.0 billion
came quite large, and the pattern of defin 1978.11, for a maximum swing of $24.4
icits in the range of 3-5 percent of state
billion. These figures again suggest that
and local expenditures gave way to large
during the 1970s and early 1980s, the cy-
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TABLE 7

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SURPLUS

PERCENT OF DIRECT EXPENDITURES

AMOUNT

AMOUNT

PERCENT

OF

(IN BILLIONS) TOTAL STATE LOCAL (IN BILLIONS) EXPENDITURES

1959 õjãõ ^53 TÍ -7Ì3
1960

-8.7

-4.5

0.0

1961

-10.6

-5.1

-3.2

1962

-7.8

-3.7

-2.0

-4.5

1963

-8.4

-3.7

-3.6

-3.7

1964

-7.6

-3.2

-0.8

-4.5

1965

-11.7

1966
1967

-11.3
-18.1

-4.5
-4.1
-6.2

-6.7
-6.4

-3.1

-5.5

0.3

-6.5

-7.3

-5.1

1968 -15.0 -4.8 -1.8 -6.5
1969 -12.0 -3.7 -2.8 -4.2
1970 -12.8 -3.8 -8.9 -0.8
1971 -12.1 -3.4 -7.7 -0.8
1972 10.6 2.9 5.5 1.3
1973 8.1 2.1 0.9 2.8
1974 -7.0 -1.8 -5.1 0.2
1975 -15.0 -3.7 -6.6 -2.0

1976 -0.9 -0.2 -1.5 0.6 1.1 0.3
1977 13.4 3.3 2.9 3.5 10.0 2.4
1978 12.3 2.9 4.0 2.2 11.2 2.7
1979 5.0 1.2 1.3 1.1 -4.1 -1.0
1980 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -11.5 -2.7
1981 4.5 1.1 0.8 1.3 -0.5 -0.1
1982 -1.7 -0.4 -5.1 2.6 -5.8 -1.4
1983 4.1 1.0 -1.6 2.7 -8.1 -1.9
1984 18.0 4.2 3.2 4.8 -16.3 -3.8
1985 12.0 2.7 0.4 4.2 -4.9 -1.1
1986 4.7 1.0 -0.3 1.8 5.7 1.2
1987 -9.9 -2.0 -3.9 -0.9 -2.0 -0.4
1988

-16.4

-3.3

-6.3

-1.3

1989 -24.8 -4.8

NOTE: Expenditures are in constant 1982 dollars, def
fixed-weight deflator.

SOURCE: State and local government general surplus
expenditures as reported in the NIPA, from CI
(machine-readable magnetic data file). Unconsol
surpluses from David J. Levin," Revenues and Ex
Local Governments, 1959-76," Survey of Curren
Levin and Peters, and Peters in May, 1986, Nov
October, 1989. Operating Surplus from David J
Government Fiscal Position: An Alternative Me

March, 1984 and updated by Levin in April, 19

for 1989,
as a
pe
clical sensitivity ofdeficit
the general
surplus
was
and local expenditures, i
decreasing.
observed
the
1970s b
Has the size of the
surplus for
been
abnordeficit 1980s?
levels of the 1960s
(Table 7).
mally high/low inthe
the
The
annual
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FIGURE 1

Real GNP and State & Local

Government Surplus

Change In QNP I« 4-Qtr Moving Average.
Source: Citibaee:Citibank economic
data-base. 1982 Dollare.

For example, the general surplus
as government,
a
as state
or a general detein the finances of the entire state
percent of total state and local rioration
expenditures was -3.3 percent in 1988 and
andlocal
-4.8
government sector. Capital expercent in 1989, which compares
to the
penditure
are clearly an important part of
levels in the 1960s, (-3.2 percent
1964
thein
explanation.
Expenditures on capital
to -6.2 percent in 1967). Otherwise,
are notthe
available from the NIPA, but a
series1980s
does exist from Government Fisurplus levels realized in the early
are quite comparable to those in the
1970s,
nances,
but only through 1988. There is
when viewed as a percent of totala expenclose relationship between the two se-

ditures.

ries; when capital spending increases, the

What explains the long-term move- surplus decreases. In particular, the sharp
ment in the surplus? It is a complicated drop in the surplus in the late 1980s par-

time series to explain because it is a com-

posite measure: it aggregates the finan-

cial position of all state and local governments, and it includes current and capital
spending but not debt financing. The trend
of growing deficits in this series can mean
many things, e.g., capital expenditure ex-

allels an upturn in capital spending at that

time.

Some disaggregation in the surplus is

possible. To get at the capital expenditure

issue, it is possible to track a series that
corresponds roughly to the current surplus. This alternative measure of the surpansion, a crisis in the financial position plus is provided in the "operating surin a very few large states, a weakening plus" calculations by Levin. The data in
in the financial position in one sector such Table 7 provide a comparison of the gen-

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 19:19:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

No. 3] ROY BAHL AND DAVID L. SJOQUIST 333
TABLE 8

CYCLICAL SWING IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SURPLUS

Average Swing Maximum Swing

(In Billions) (In Billions)
Cycle Current Constant Current Constant
1960.11

-

1969.IV

-1.0

-1.7

1.2

5.2

1970.1 - 1973.IV 6.3 15.0 20.5 47.0 (1)
1974.1 - 1979.IV 8.5 13.8 24.4 39.8 (2)
1980.1 - 1981.11 4.6 5.1 8.4 9.4 (3)
1981.

m

-

1989.IV

-3.6

-2.0

27.0

24.9

SOURCE: Business cycles from National Bureau
Current Business , November, 1987. State
Local Government Purchase Deflator as re
Economic Database (machine-readable mag

(1)
(2)
(3)

Contraction
Contraction
Contraction

eral

surplus

1976

minimum:
minimum:
minimum:

-$18.5, 1970.4; exp
-$20.3, 1975.1; exp
-$4.0, 1980.2; expa

government's
deficit as a percent
of exthe
operating
surplus
fo
penditures
was larger
and close
to his1987,
the
only
years
fo

and

through

toric highs.surplus has been eswhich the operating
can only
conjecturethey
about this pattimated. One can We
see
that
do not fo
tern.term
Part of the answer
is a greater cy- The oplow the same long
pattern.
clical sensitivity of
state be
revenue smaller
sources.
erating surplus tends
to
tha
Another possible
explanation
is the larger
effect
the general surplus
and
has
ave
the 1986 Tax Reform Act on state revage year-to-year of
swings.
enues and the
reported
overestimation of as a
The general surplus
is
calculated
total for the state and local sector and is
revenues for 1988. It may also be the case
that capital spending, which increased in
not divided between state and local gov-

the 1980s, was more likely to have been
ernments. Levin and Peters have proundertaken by state governments.
duced annual estimates of the general
For the past decade or so, the National
surplus for states and for local governConference of State Legislatures and Naments. The breakdown of the general surtional Association of State Budget Offiplus expressed as a percent of general

revenues for each of the two sectors is
shown in Table 7. There is no consistent

cers have surveyed state governments regarding budget conditions, focusing on the

general fund budget.6 Evidence on the
pattern between the two series, though
geographic distribution of the year-end
state governments seem to have greater

as a percent of general fund exswings in the size of the surplus and balances
are
penditures is provided in Table 9. In the
more likely to run deficits than are local

early 1980s, the Southwest and Rocky
governments. While both government

sectors ran deficits in 1987 and 1988, Mountain
the
regions held large balances,
while the New England region was exlast two years of available data, the state
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there has
been a change
in the state and
periencing deficits and
other
northern
states had relativelylocal
small
government
positive
behavior regarding
bal- the
ances. By the late 1980s
surplus,
the
we situation
re-estimated a model
had presented
in Bahl
and Southwest
Duncombe (1989), but
changed. The balances
for
the

used an extended
data set
and additional
had declined substantially,
while
they
in-

The model
assumes
that there
creased moderately variables.
in the
New
England

region. For the last three
or
fourlevel
years
that
is some
"desired"
of surplus,
which
a function
of a setone
of determinant
variare reported in Table is9
all but
region
have experienced a decrease
ables. Bahl and
in Duncombe
their posit
yeara stanend balances, the exception
dard process of adjustment
being
that
the
allows for
Southwest region, for
only
which
some fraction
the
of the
year-end
adjustment to be
balance has remained small and relamade in one period, i.e.,
tively constant.

From the data on the state versus local
(, st - st- 1) = '(sf - st- 1) (1)
general surplus and on year-end balances
it appears that the large increase in where
the
st represents surplus in period t and
general surplus in the early 1980s was the
sf represents the desired surplus. The deresult of a very healthy local government
sired surplus is assumed to be a function
of a set of variables x,
sector in a few states, while the large
general deficit found in the latter part of
the 1980s was experienced by both the
sf = ßo + ßjC + €ř (2)

state and local sectors and was more re-

flective of a situation throughout the
Combining (1) and (2) we obtain
timating equation
To what extent is the pattern of the
general surplus over the past three dest - ßoX + ßXx + (1 - k)st- 1 + Xeř (3)

United States.

cades a function of the macroeconomy and
to what extent is it due to a change in the
The purpose of this exercise is to con-

trol for the determinants of the level of
underlying behavior of state and local
governments? The surplus respondsthe
to surplus, and then explore whether the
GNP (Figure 1) and also appears to rebehavior of the surplus changed in the

1980s. The control variables included in
spond to the rate of increase in GNP, i.e.,

the model are:
the general surplus increases when GNP
increases at a faster rate and decreases
1. real GNP, which is expected to be

when GNP increases at a slower rate, positively
and
related to the surplus;
that this relationship occurs with a slight
2. inflation, which is expected to be
lag. Thus, part of the movement innegatively
the
related to the surplus;
operating surplus reflects the movement
3. oil and gasoline price, which is exin GNP. Compared to the 1960s, the 1970s
pected to be positively related to the sur-

and early 1980s was a period of much
plus;
greater economic instability in that 4.
the
real federal aid, which is expected to
quarterly fluctuations in real GNP be
were
positively related to the surplus;
much greater. The general surplus fol5. interest rate, which is expected to be

lowed the change in GNP relatively closely
positively related to the surplus and is used
during the period 1970 through 1986. asSince
an intrument for capital spending.

1986, however, the relationship between
A time dummy variable is included in
order
the general surplus and the change
in to test for a structural shift in the
GNP appears to have changed.
behavior of the surplus in the 1980s. We
We have explored a number of factors
also interact the dummy variable with real

that might explain the movement of GNP,
op- inflation, and federal aid.
erating surpluses. In order to determine
The model was estimated for the period
whether these variables can account for
1958. 1-1989. IV. 7 The results of the
the movement in the surplus or whether
regression are reported in Table 10. The
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tainedsignificant
for the full model. When
we comcoefficient on GNP was
and
of
pared inflation
the predicted surplus
using the esthe expected sign. The
measure
timated regression
equation, with the
was significant and negative
as expected.
actual surplus, we get a relatively
close
The coefficient on intergovernmental
aid
fit. and
The implications
of the analysis
is that
was highly significant
positive
as exthe behavior
of the state and local
sector,
pected. The only other
significant
varireflected
by variations
in thethe
general
able was the interest as
rate,
which
took
surplus, was not different during the
expected positive sign.
1980s.
While Bahl and Duncombe
found a significant effect for the dummy variable, the

results from the expanded
time period
V. The 1990s

suggest that there was not a shift in beIn order to understand
what the nature
havior in the 1980s. Neither
the intercept
of the state andvariables
local sector will beare
in the
nor the interaction dummy
1990s, it is necessary to address the unsignificant.8

Given that neither the lagged value of

the surplus, the dummy variables, nor the

interaction terms are significant, the
model was re-estimated deleting these
variables. The results for the remaining
variables are very similar to those ob-

derlying forces that are likely to be at work

during the decade. Presently the economy

is growing slowly, with the predicted

recession having been postponed for sev-

eral years. There is no one consideration
that suggests that the macroeconomic

TABLE 10

REGRESSION EQUATION WITH REAL GENERAL SURPLUS
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant

-159.170 75.979 -2.095
-0.027 0.082 -0.331
GNP 0.040 0.015 2.731
Inflation -1.098 0.469 -2.340
Grants 1.013 0.097 10.423

Oil/Gasoline Price 0.058 0.114 0.508
Interest

2.482

0.892

2.781

Dummy 38.568 55.289 0.698
Dummy x GNP 0.005 0.028 0.176
Dummy x Inflation -0.223 0.522 -0.428
Dummy x Grants -0.328 0.268 -1.228
AR (1) 1.214 0.118 10.299
AR (2) -0.232 0.119 -1.954

R-squared 0.922 Log likelihood -313.425

Durbin- Watson statistic 2.055 F-statistic 106.946
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picture will change dramatically.
But
therein public schools
mographics.
Enrollment
has been decreasing, which is part of the
tion is calmer; the economic integration
explanation of the decline in the relative
of Western Europe should expand marimportance of education in state and local
kets and increase competition, and the expenditures.
reDuring the 1990s, this trend
laxing of tension in Eastern Europe will
in enrollment is expected to reverse, and
provide opportunities to export expansion
there should be a very small increase in
and will lead to reduced military spendenrollments - about 10 percent for the deing.
cade. The second major factor is the nuare new considerations. The world situa-

The possible reduction in military
merous court cases dealing with the eqspending has led to discussion of a peace uity of state financing of education. To the
dividend. However, there are so many
extent that these cases require greater
competing demands for these funds, not equity in financing of education, it will

the least of which is the federal deficit, likely result in increased state support for
that there is little expectation that state education. Finally, there is the possibility
and local governments will receive any of of a federal and state re-emphasis on ed-

these funds in the form of increased fed-

ucation: the former because of a national

eral aid. Moreover, cutbacks in military
concern about international competitivespending could compromise the economic
ness and the latter as part of a strategy

and fiscal base of several states.

to compete for jobs with other states.
The continuation of the regional shiftsThe effect of the three forces will be to
of business and population to the south increase
and
education spending by local govwest, i.e., to low tax and expenditureernments, but perhaps not by enough to

states, will likely dampen the growthoffset
of
the decline in its relative impor-

the state and local sector. However, be-

tance in the state and local sector. This is

may not be a major factor in the 1990s.

sitated by the aging of the population, ex-

cause regional differences in tax and true because of the other claims: the inspending patterns have narrowed, this crease in expenditures that will be necesThe concern about the condition of the

penditures on the criminal justice and

public infrastructure has led several statepenal system, and infrastructure spendgovernments to enact programs to ening all may be higher in the pecking or-

courage public investment by local gov-der than education.
ernments. However, the increase in cap- A final factor is the effect of tax reform.

ital spending that began in the mid-1980s The new tax code may cause state and lohas leveled off and high interest rates will cal governments to adjust how they tax as

likely continue to restrict capital spend-well as how they spend. The federal tax
reform could result in increased fiscal
ing to below historic levels.
The slow growth in the state and localcompetition between the city and its subsector during the 1980s has been attrib-urbs; reduced taxable capacity among cit-

uted in part to the tax and expenditure ies; and increased competition between

limitation movement. There are signs,

states.

nia) have enacted tax increases and voter
approval of bond referenda has increased

growth in state revenues, which will depress state aid, and an increase in the rel-

however, that this movement has weak- Increased city-suburban competition will
ened. Several states (including Califor- come about because of slower natural

during the past few years. This suggests ative price of suburban property taxes.
Consider first the prospects for a slower
growth in state government revenues.
tinue to expand, perhaps more rapidly than
Elimination of sales" tax deductibility and
during the 1980s.
reduction in the federal marginal tax rate
Education remains a major expenditure
raised the price of state and local governfocus despite its relative decline in recent
ment taxes for those who itemize deducyears. There are three major factors
Itemizer-voters will react to this by
working here. First is the effect of tions.9
de-

that the state and local sector will con-
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demanding lower state
financing.
taxes.10
This This
suggestsslower
that states will
be more
hesitantfurther
to let their taxcutrates drift
growth in taxes, coupled
with
backs in federal aid, will
a smaller
"out oflead
line," to
particularly
those that already are
In fact,
one view
revenue pool from which
torelatively
drawhigh.
state
aid
that
morestate
than ever
before,
states and
to local governments. is
If
the
aid
share
of total state government
expenditures
cities will compete
for jobs using fiscal incentives.11
remains approximately
constant, less state
The loss
in federal
aid and the reducaid to local governments
will
result.
The other side of this
is that
the
tionstory
in the marginal
tax rates
have comcompetition for this reduced
pool of the
state
bined to alter significantly
tax price
aid will be more keen. Pressure will build
of a unit of state and local expenditures.
to reduce the local property tax. IndusFor example, in 1978 the tax price in New

trial taxpayers - because capital-intenYork was 0.60, while in Georgia it was
sive firms experienced a significant 0.66.
tax In 1988, the tax prices for the two

increase due to the 1986 reform - and

states were equal at .075. 12
suburban residents - who have higher inThe urban poor are not affected directly

comes and are more likely to itemize
by-federal tax reform since, in general,
have lost some of the federal subsidy
to do not pay income taxes. More imthey

portant
are the indirect effects on the urtheir property tax bill, and will look to
the
state capitol for relief in the form ofban
in- poor. One can but speculate about
creased school aid. Such proposals are not
these. One scenario is that the long-run
likely to fall on deaf ears in the suburincome elasticity of the reformed federal
income tax (and state income taxes) will
ban-dominated state legislature. Cities,
whose residents do not suffer as much dibe lower, suggesting a lower revenue yield
rectly from the loss of deductibility andrelative to GNP in the future. If national

from lower marginal tax rates, may not
income growth slows, even greater fed-

fare well in such a competition. Moreover,
eral aid cuts will be forced. These cuts may
if the increased state aid is "funded" from
be borne heavily by the social programs.
cuts in social programs, city residents will
State aid and direct expenditures for the
be doubly-damned.
poor also could suffer because of removal

How might this situation be avoided,of the federal deductibility subsidy and

that is, how might the potential revenuebecause of interstate and interlocal fiscal
reductions be covered? Consider the pos-competition. In addition, there may be less

sibilities: (a) increased federal aid; (b) inrental housing construction and a drift
creased growth rates in state and citytoward higher rents, both factors that

economies; (c) increased sales, income or
compromise the real income position of the
property tax rates; and, (d) retrenchment. urban poor.
As we argued above, the first seems highly
The solution of the federal budget defunlikely. The second will occur in some icit problem appears almost certain to lead
places but not others. The third would be to some form of tax increase in the future.

If the decision is made to raise the addinecessary for any significant change.
However, voluntary increases seem im- tional funds through income taxation, then
probable, especially for states that are al- two likely avenues of reform are a temready in a noncompetitive taxing posi- porary income tax surrate and a reduction, because the "price" of tax increases tion in tax expenditures such as the deis now higher and because some states
ductibility of state and local government

have just taken a major step in the direc-

income and property taxes. While both of

tion of lowering income taxes. Expendi- these measures will work in the direction
ture reductions and heightened city-sub- of increasing federal revenues, it is not
urban competition for a smaller pool of clear how they will affect the revenuestate aid are almost certain to result.
raising decisions of state and local govFederal aid reductions and the reduc-

ernments.

tion in the federal tax subsidy will force
On the one hand, an increase in the
all states to rely more heavily on their marginal
own
tax rate will reduce the after-
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federal-tax purchasing power
of local
importance
of thecitproperty tax.

izens, and therefore will erode
theall
base
Considering
of these forces, a rea-

which state and local governments
tax. is
On
sonable proposition
that the trends ob-

the other hand, the higher
marginal
tax
served
in the 1980s
will generally continue into the 1990s. Relative to personal
ity of income and property taxes and
income, the state and local government
therefore will reduce the price of state and
sector could grow slightly slower than
local government taxes. This will have during
the
the 1980s. The share of revenue
effect, all other things being same, of generated
reby the state and local sector,
moving some of the disincentive of state
however, will continue to increase, a conand local governments to increase taxaclusion based on the assumption that the
tion.
federal deficit problem will not be solved,
If the federal government were to move
at least not by a federal tax increase. The
in the direction of broadening the federal
resulting decline in federal aid will force
income tax base by reducing certain state
tax and local governments to raise more
rate will increase the value of deductibil-

from their own sources. The deexpenditures, property tax and income revenue
tax

deductibility would be a likely target.
If in importance of the state governcline

deductibility were eliminated, or even ment
rein the state and local sector will,
duced for these two taxes, the result would
however, change. The changing demobe to drive up the tax price for those who
graphics and education financing reform

itemize deductions. The result would be

will force increases in relative impor-

an increased resistance to higher statetance
and of state governments.
In sum, the 1990s will not be a lot diflocal government taxes and quite likely
some pressure to lower the effective ferent
tax than the 1980s.

rate.

Where does all of this lead? The slow

VI. Conclusions

but relatively stable national economy will

The
result in slow growth in government
at nature of American federalism
changed in the 1980s, as several trends
budget deficit problems of the federal
were clearly bent. The new movement is
government will restrain its growth,
im- fiscal decentralization, the passtoward

all levels in the 1990s. The continued

plying that the relative importance ing
of the
to subnational governments of the responsibility for a greater share of taxing

state and local sector will increase. The

weakening of the tax limitation moveand spending decisions. The state and local governments share of total govern-

ment means that the state and local sec-

ment direct expenditures and revenue retor will expand somewhat faster, furthersponsibility declined from the mid-1970s
ing its relative importance. On the other
to the mid-1980s. However, in the later
hand, the increases in tax price and compart of the 1980s the trend was reversed.
petition for jobs, and the reduced income
elasticity of state tax structures will reThe declining relative importance was ar-

strain growth of the state and local rested
secduring the 1980s. Furthermore,
there were significant changes in the

tor.

The concern over the public infrastruccomposition of both expenditures and revture will be offset somewhat by the higher
enues of state and local governments, the

interest rates, but capital spending biggest
will
changes being the declining demost likely be greater in the 1990s pendence
than
on federal aid and the declining
the 1980s. It is unlikely to reach the levimportance of education. Finally, the 1980s
els of the 1960s. This factor, combined saw
withlarge and growing general deficits in

state and local sector.
the predicted stability in the economythe
will
keep both the level and fluctuations of the
Some would argue that the changes in
the 1980s do not represent a structural
general surplus smaller than in the 1980s.
The change in education financingshift
im- but rather only some temporary reactions to the times, and that such templies increased centralization of revenue
and a marked reduction in the relative
porary breaks have long characterized the
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state and local government
expansion
sector.13
and wouldIt
be also
able to draw this
down to buffer the reduced federal sub1980s has been a product of conservative
sidies, and state and local government

could be said that fiscal behavior in the

politics and economics, and in time taxes
even were not high by historical stan-

this will change. Yet, the "turning point"
dards. Anyway, state and local govern-

in state and local government finances
ments had been getting by with less. A

seems to have been reached about 10-12

new fiscal conservatism had grown up in

the aftermath
of the 1975 recession and
years ago and this is a long period for
a

temporary change.
the tax limitation movement. Finally, reWhy has the U.S. fiscal system become
gional shifts in economic activity had re-

more decentralized? The conventional ar-

duced the interstate disparity in income
gument is that President Reagan's new
so that the equalization mandate of the

federalism was the result of a desire to federal
get
grant system no longer seemed as
government decision-making closer to important
the
as it once had.
people. Decentralization, it is argued, willThe result of this confluence of factors
is that we live in a much more decenlead to more citizen participation in government and to a greater degree of tralized
acfiscal system now than we did ten
countability of local government officials
years ago. A greater fraction of every dolto their constituencies. But the impetus
lar's worth of public services consumed is
actually came more from the notion that
directly provided by subnational governa smaller federal sector would allow
ments, and the gap between what a state
American business to perform better.
The
or local
government spends and the
amount
of revenue it must raise has nartax reforms of 1981 and 1986 reduced
per-

sonal tax rates and the elasticity
of the
rowed.
An increasing share of state and
local government budgets is being fibut impossible to go back. The federalnanced
aid
by user and benefit charges, and

federal income tax and have made it all

retrenchment program, grant consolidaother non-tax revenues. As the longer term
tion and deregulation were part of reaction
the
to the provisions of the 1986 tax
same movement, as was the elimination
reforms unfold, and if federal grant reof sales tax deductibility.
ductions continue, it is possible that state
In many ways the setting was just right and local government budgets will grow

for the shift to decentralization to come

more slowly and that fiscal competition
about. The President was enormously
among the states will become more inpopular and a reduced federal involve- tense. The analysis of the forces that are
ment in the economy was at the core of most likely to be acting on governments
his program. The balance of payments in the 1990s, suggests a continuation of

deficit had popularized the ideas of flag- the trends.
The 1980s has been a time of rethinkging productivity, the declining competitiveness of American business, and the
ing the objectives of government in the
need for less government spending and U.S. and sorting out the roles of the three
more private investment. The federal in- levels of government. The general tenor
come tax was seen by most as the chief has been a shift in emphasis from the reculprit - complicated, unfair and a disin- distribution of income to efficiency. The
centive to investors and entrepreneurs -results of this have shown up in both an
and the move to a lower rate and a flatter
improved fiscal responsibility at all levels
rate structure with elimination of some
of government and a growing population
tax expenditures was accepted as a fair
of the poor. In this new setting, state and

trade.

local governments have been given more
State and local governments seemed
to
responsibility
to allocate resources - that
be in a position to take the hits of grant
function which they do best. The next step
retrenchment and removal of part of in
thethe sorting out process is to assign a
deductibility subsidy. They had accumuresponsibility for redressing disparities
lated a substantial balance during the long
among state and local governments and
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for determining a proper divisionREFERENCES
of responsibility for looking after the poor.
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